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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

In the Matter of the Estate of
JOHN W. BAUM,

Deceased.

)
~

CASE
NO. 8422

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts as set
forth in appellants' brief except the following, which has
been omitted, and which respondent feels is a pertinent fact
in the case: At the hearing in the District Court before
the HJonorable Judge R. L. Tuekett the parties entered into
an oral stipulation that any technical objections to the petition for partial distribution would be waived and that the
hearing would be held solely upon the construction of the
will and the determination of the interests of George Baum
and Oliver Baum in the said estate (R. 33.)
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STA'fEMENT OF POINTS

POINT ONE
THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM IS UNAMBIGUOUS,
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THE INTENTION OF
THE TESTATOR CAN DEFINITELY BE ASCERTAINED
FROM THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE WILL
ITSELF, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO HOLDING.
POINT TWO
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE TO
VARY, CONTRADICT OR EXPLAIN THE TERMS OF
A WILL UNDER THE FACT SITUATION AS PRESENTED BY THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM.
THE ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM IS UNAMBIGUOUS,
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THE INTENTION OF
THE TESTATOR CAN DEFINITELY BE ASCERTAINED
FROM THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE WILL
ITSELF, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO HOLDING.
In analyzing the argument of appellants it appears
that they have quoted isolated paragraphs of the testator's
will and atte,mpted to ascertain the intention of the testator from such isola ted paragraphs. We have been unable
to find any case allowing such to be done. On the contrary
there are numerous cases holding that the intention of the
testator is to be collected from the entire will and not from
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any one paragraph contained therein.
ing this principle of law:

We cite as sustain-

In Re: Northcutt's Estate
16 Calif. 2d 683
107 P. 2d 607
We invite the Court to read the entire will of John W.
B:mm and after doing so we submit that there can be no
doubt as to the intention of the testator to cut George Baum ·
and Oliver Baum off with the sum of one dollar and no more.
We think there can be no dispute as to the rule of law
that the intention of the testator governs and with that the
further rule that if that intention can be ascertained from
within the four corners of the will itself there can be no
room for introduction of parol or extrinsic evidence.
Section 74-2-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953
"Tesiator's intention governs.-A will is to be construed
according to the intention of the testator. Where his
intention can not have effect to its full extent, it must
have effect as far as possible."
\Ve also refer to the following authorities:
In Re: Poppleton Estate.
34 Utah, 285, 97 P. 138,
fnd particularly Paragraph 1135.
~lso:

Vol. 57, Am. Jur.

Appellants in their brlef have quoted Section 75-12-9,
Utah Cod2 Annotated, 1953, and seem to lay great stress
upon the provisions of that section. We wish to point out
that this section in no way alters the rule that the intention
qf the te3tatcr must govern and that if that intention can
be determined from the will itself no extrinsic evidence is
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admissible. This section only operates when questions have
been raised by the will itself with respect to the amount of
advancements.
With respect to appellants' averment of the friendly
relations between the testator and his two sons, the law is
definitely settled that evidence of friendly or unfriendly relations between testator and the beneficiary is not admissible to show intention of the testator to include or exclude
such beneficiary.
Vol. 4, Page on Wills,
(Lifetime Edition)
Section 1627, page 676
Moffatt vs. Heon,
136 N. E. 123
Appellants, at Page 7 of their brief, quote the following
clause from paragraph XI of the will of John W. Baum, "It
is my desire to treat all of my children alike in the disposition of my property." Appellants lay great stress upon
this clause at various places in their brief in an attempt to
show that the testator was confused or that there was some
ambiguity in the will with respect to his intention. However, appellants did not include the remainder of the sentence, which reads as follows, "and the aforesaid provisions
accomplish this result in as fair and equal a manner as could
be done."
,
When this paragraph is taken in light of the dispositions made by the testator of his property in the will as contained in paragraphs IV, V, and VI. no stretch of the imagination can conceive of any ambiguity.
We submit that the testator, without question, intended
George Baum and Oliver Baum to receive the sum of one
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dollar each and no n1ore. We further submit that the entire
will, when read as a whole, definitely shows such-intention,
and the various paragraphs therein cited by appellants in
an attempt to show some ambiguity, are merely explanations by the testator for doing what he has clearly done.
POINT TWO
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE TO
VARY, CONTRADICT OR EXPLAIN THE TERMS OF
A WILL UNDER THE FACT SITUATION AS PRESENTED BY THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM.

In examining appellants' brief and the record on appeal, and particularly the petition of appellants for construction of the will, we note that they lay great stress upon their
contention that the testator was mistaken as to the amount
of property which he had previously given to various ones,
and particularly to the appellants. The law is well settled.
that error or mistake on the part of the testa tor as to the
fact or amount of advancements alleged to have been made
in the will does not permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the will.
We have found no case contrary to that statement, but
we find numerous authorities in support thereof. We cite
the following representing such decisions:
Vol. 4, Page on Wills,
(Lifetime Edition)
Section 1627, page 676
Hopper vs. Sellers ( Kan.)
139 P. 365
In Re: Woelk's Estate (Kan.)
296 P. 359
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Am. Jur. Vol. 57,
Page 674 and page 680
In Re: Tompkins (Cal.)
64 P. 268
Buchanan vs. Hlunter, (Iowa)
148 Northwestern, 881
Lavenue vs. Lewis, (Ark.)
46 s. w. 2d 649
Bimslager vs. Bimslager, (Ill.)
154, Northeastern, 135
La Flore vs. Handlin, (Ark.)
240 Southwestern 712
We further refer the Court's attention to the annotation in
94 A. L. R., commencing at Page 26
In further establishing Point Two we wish to discuss
some of the cases cited above more in detail. With respect
to the allegation of appellants that the testator was mistaken when he said that they had had their share of his
property we wish to refer to Hopper vs. Sellers, cited above.
In that case testatrix recited in her will that two sons were
indebted to her in stated amounts and that if such amounts
were not paid before her death they should be deducted from
their distributive shares. The sons offered proof that testatrix was mistaken and that they were not indebted in such
amormts. Held, as a matter of law that such proof is not
admissible.
In Re: Woell<:'s Estate, cited above, is to the same
effect.
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In Buchanan vs. Hunter, cited above, the testator, in
attempting to equalize the distribution between his daughters stated that one daughter had received advancements
amounting to $40,000.00. The daughter claimed such to be
a mistake, and that she had .actually received not to exceed
$15,000.00. Held, that such evidence, as a matter of law,
was inadmissible.
In Bimslager vs. Bimslager, cited above, the Court said,
"The main object in construing a will is to find the intentions of the testa tor. Extrinsic evidence is never admissible
for the purpose of varying the intention of the testator as
expressed in the will itself."
No words can be added to or taken from a will which
change the plain meaning of the testator. No will can be
reformed because of a mistake made therein by the testator.
We refer the Court to Lavenue vs. Lewis, cited above.
In that case the will stated that the testator made no provision for certain named sons because of previous advancements equal to their interests in his estate. It was held that
evidence regarding such advancements were inadmissible.
Also, LeFlore vs. Handlin, cited above, where a will giving $100.00 to a son and each of his children stated that the
testatrix purposely made no further provision for them because the son had received a larger share of the father's
estate than the other children. Evidence was not admissible
to show that testatrix was mistaken as to the amount received by the son from his father's estate.
Appellants rely strongly upon the case of In Re: Pickard's Estate, 41 Utah 145; 129 P. 353. We have no argument with the rule laid down in that case, but wish to point
out that the fact situation in that case is wholly different

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

from that in the case at bar. We quote from the portion
of the will in the case of: In Re: Pickard's Estate, as follows:
"all of the residue of my property . . . . I give and
bequath . . . . in trust for the benefit of my said
daughter and of my son . . . . equally, except so far
as sums have been or shall be set off against the interests which either would be entitled to under the pro..
visions of this will, respectively, in case such sums had
remained a part of the assets of the estate; THE
SHARE OF MY SAID DAUGHTER AND SON TO BE
DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF MY DECEASE." ( empha sis supplied.)
Obviously in that case testimony had to be introduced
to indicate what, if any, amount should be set off as against
the interests which either the daughter or the son would be
entitled to. In the case at bar there is no such ambiguity.
The will definitely states that George and Oliver have had
their share and hence there is no room for any extrinsic evidence to contradict that statement.
In their statement of facts ,at Page 4 of appellants'

brief, reference is made to a certain discharge agreement
between appellants and the testator alleged to have been
executed sometime around 1928. We refer the Court's attention to the case of: In Re: Tompkins, above cited. In
this case there was an instrument executed many years previously and which the court refused to allow in evidence and
which, we feel, very nearly proximates the situation in the
Baum estate.
at

We refer the Court's attention to the language in 64 P.
270, as follows:

P~ge

"It would render the entire clause inoperative if it
should be held that its provisions could be defeated by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

an inference to be drawn from an instrument executed
many years previously, and to which the will makes
no reference."
Appellants have spent considerable time in their brief
pointing to the various authorities with respect to latent and
patent ambiguities. We submit that there is neither type
to be found in the John W. Baum will. Counsel cites the
case of Payne vs. Todd, 43 P. 2d, 1004 (1935). We submit
that this case is very similar to the Utah case of: In Re: Pickard's Estate, cited above, but that the fact situation is entirely distinguishable from that of the case at bar.
We refer to Page 1004 of 43 P. 2d and quote from the
will as follows:

"Fourth: I release and forgive my son Stanley T.
Payne, whether living at my death or not, the sum of
approximately $3000.00 and interest which may be unpaid at the date of my death, or such part of said principal sum and interest as shall remain unpaid; the said
swn being the amount loaned by me to my said son, it
being my purpose to have the said debt cancelled, if it
still exists at the time of my death, and this cancellation is made as a part of the share of my estate which
might otherwise be bequeathed to him, and my said son
will understand this arrangement."
"Seventh: All the rest and residue of the property of
which I die possessed, I bequeath and devise unto my
said five children, to be distributed equally among them,
share and share alike."
Let us compare the two paragraphs above from the will
of Edwin C. Payne to paragraphs IV, V, and VI of the will
of John W. Baum, which are as follows:
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"IV. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son,
Oliver Baum, the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no
more, he having heretofore received in real property
his full share of my estate.
"V. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son,
George Baum, the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no
more, he having heretofore received in real property
his full share of my estate."
"VI. I hereby devise, give and bequeath all the rest,
residue and remainder of my property and estate,
wheresoever it may be situate, whether it be real, personal, or mixed, to Newell H. Baum and Vadis B. McOmber, and Ora Baum Nielson, and IVJ:urray Baum, each
to share and share alike."
We submit that after reading the above paragraphs
there could be little question that the fact situation in the
Payne vs. Todd case is wholly distinguishable from that of
the case at bar. In the former the intention of the testator
is not clear, whereas in the Baum case the testator has left
no room for conjecture as to his intention, and hence parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary the same.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion we submit that fron1 a reading of the entire will of John W. Baum there can be no question but that
the intention of the testator was clearly set out to bequeath
to Oliver Baum and George Baum one dollar each and no
more. And, further, a reading of the entire will shows the
same_ to be clear and unambiguous.
We also submit that the law is well settled in such cases
that no extrinsic or parol evidence is admissible to vary or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

contradict the tenns of the will or the intention of the testator as contained therein. It necessarily follows that the
findings and order of the Trial Court should be sustained
and affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE,
Attorney for Respondent
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